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Abstract—An anonymization technique for databases is
proposed that employs Principal Component Analysis. The
technique aims at releasing the least possible amount of
information, while preserving the utility of the data released in
response to queries. The general scheme is described, and alter-
native metrics are proposed to assess utility, based respectively
on matrix norms; correlation coefficients; divergence measures,
and quality indices of database images. This approach allows
to properly measure the utility of output data and incorporate
that measure in the anonymization method.
Index Terms—Anonymization; Privacy; Principal Component
Analysis; Databases
I. INTRODUCTION
ANONYMIZATION may be employed in databases toachieve privacy protection. Through anonymization,
personally identifiable information is removed, or obfus-
cated so that the people whom the data describe remain
anonymous. Several techniques have been proposed in the
literature to achieve anonymization (see, e.g., [1] for a
survey).
While those techniques may exhibit several degrees of ro-
bustness against re-identification attacks (see, e.g., Bayesian
attacks for differential privacy schemes [2], [3], or attacks
based on the exploitation of externalities [4], or the use
of recolouring techniques borrowed from signal processing
[5]), they often fail to take into account the resulting utility
of released data. For example, in randomization-based tech-
niques, the amount of added noise needed to obscure the true
data may be so large as to make the query output useless. In
differential privacy, this may require a careful choice of the
mechanism parameters [6], [7]. The contrasting wishes to
minimize the risk of re-identification while providing useful
data to queriers gives rise to an anonymization-utility trade-
off, which triggers the need for proper utility measures and
utility-aware anonymization techniques [8].
In this paper, we introduce a technique that would provide
a utility-aware anonymization for databases. Our technique
is based on a novel use of Principal Component Analysis
(PCA), a statistical technique to achieve dimensionality
reduction that has already been employed to protect privacy
[9]. The technique is typically employed in signal processing
applications to reduce the information as little as possible,
while maintaining the quality of the output data. Instead,
here we strive to achieve the maximum possible loss of
information (and then potential individuals’ identification),
while preserving the utility of the output data. For that
purpose, we introduce metrics of utility and incorporate
them in the anonymization technique. The new approach
we propose can therefore boast a built-in utility-aware
mechanism, in contrast to existing anonymization technique,
where data utility is not explicitly considered or is not
properly measured.
Here we do not fully explore the technique, but rather set
up a conceptual framework and propose several alternatives
for its implementation. Our contributions are:
• incorporating utility measurement in the proposed
PCA-based anonymization scheme (Section III).
• proposing four categories of metrics to assess the
residual utility of released data (Section IV);
II. PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a statistical tech-
nique that applies linear transformations to a set of variables
so as to arrive at a new set of variables that are statistically
uncorrelated. It is typically employed to reduce the number
of variables (the principal components, i.e. a subset of
the new variables mentioned above) that retain most of
the information contained in the original set. An extensive
treatment of PCA is contained, e.g., in [10]
The PCA technique considers a set of n observations of p
variables. Each observation represents a point in Rp. Actu-
ally, we are dealing with databases, where data concerning
subjects may be seen as matrices where each row is a record
representing the data concerning a specific individual, and
the columns are the fields representing the attributes of the
data subject. For the time being, we consider just databases
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Fig. 1: Example of PCA for a multivariate Gaussian dataset
made of numerical entries: we defer the case of categorical
attributes to a later implementation of our method.
As recalled, each principal component is actually a linear
transformation of the original variables. We can have at most
the same number of principal components as the original
variables, i.e. p, but the main aim of PCA is to reduce
the dimensionality of the description: we wish to retain m
principal components, with m ≤ p.
The principal components are built starting from the most
important one, i.e., that retaining the major portion of the
information. In mathematical terms, that means building
a linear combination of the p variables (i.e., setting its
weights) so that it exhibits the maximum variance (under
the constraint that the weight vector has unitary length).
A graphical representation of PCA in R2 is shown in
Fig. 1, where the two axes representing the two principal
components are shown for data following a multivariate
Gaussian distribution.
The PCA technique has already been employed as an
exploratory tool to describe large databases [11], [12].
Though the traditional way to employ PCA is to achieve
dimensionality reduction by sacrificing as little information
as possible (i.e., removing principal components starting
from the least ones), for our purposes we wish instead to
apply the PCA technique in a different way, to achieve as
much information reduction as possible.
III. ANONYMIZATION BY PCA
After describing how PCA works, we now turn to its
use to anonymize a database. In this section, we describe
the overall method, starting with the rationale and then
providing the step-by-step procedure.
PCA defines a new set of axes that represent linear
combinations of the original variables. The typical applica-
tion of PCA includes removing some principal components,
by retaining the largest ones. Such a procedure has two
limitations for our purpose:
• removing the least principal components achieves a
reduction of information as small as possible;
• the principal components do not represent physically
meaningful variables (e.g. a linear combination of
height and income).
We overcome those limitations through the following mod-
ification of the typical application:
• we start removing principal components starting from
the largest one;
• after removing the largest principal components, we
project the resulting data onto the original axes, so that
we revert to the original attributes of the subjects (e.g.,
height and income separately).
The resulting procedure goes through the following steps:
1) Form an array corresponding to the full database,
represented as a collection of vectors in Rp;
2) Apply a PCA transformation to the array;
3) Remove the principal component corresponding to the
largest eigenvalue;
4) Project the resulting collection of vectors on the
original set of axes in Rp;
5) Apply a utility metric;
6) If the utility is still large enough then go back to step
2;
7) Transform the collection of vectors back into a
database.
Steps 1-4 and 7 are quite straightforward and anyway
well described in several textbooks. Instead, the choice of
utility metrics and its employment are dealt with in the next
section. The check embodied by Step 6 allows us to see
if further information can be removed: if the utility is still
large enough, that means that we can further reduce it and
achieve a higher degree of anonymization.
IV. UTILITY METRICS
In the procedure we have sketched in Section III, we
have mentioned the use of utility metrics. Those metrics
allow us to assess how far the anonymized version of the
database is from the true database or, in other terms, if
the anonymized version can still be useful for queriers.
In Section III we have not provided further details about
such metrics. We fill the gap in this section, by providing
four different proposals, i.e., four metrics that can serve that
purpose. Those metrics are not intended to be alternative,
since they could be employed in conjunction.
The four metrics (or classes of metrics, since we may have
some alternative possibilities for each of them) we propose
are:
1) Matrix norms;
2) Correlation;
3) Divergence measure;
4) Database image quality.
Matrix norms. The first metric is based on the matrix
representation of the database. Our database of n records
and p fields is represented as a matrix with n rows and
p columns. In the following, we indicate the number of
columns by m, since we assume to act after PC removal.
We can first apply a standardisation procedure, so that
the results are not influenced by the different ranges of
the variables: for example, if the two fields were height
and income, measured respectively in meters and euros,
the differences in the income field would dominate. If we
call A the matrix representing the true database and B the
matrix representing the anonymised database (with elements
aij and bij respectively), the standardisation field by field
would require the computation of the mean and the standard
deviation for each field
µj =
1
n
n∑
i=1
aij
σj =
√∑n
i=1(aij − µj)2
n
.
(1)
By acting on the standardized values aˆij =
aij−µj
σj
and
bˆij =
bij−µj
σj
, we form the difference matrix D, whose
generic element is dij = |aˆij − bˆij | = |aij−bj |σj , 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and 1 ≤ j ≤ m (we are not interested in the sign of the
distance between the true database and the anonymized one).
Having defined the difference matrix, we can now adopt
a metric M for the size of its contents. Among the most
widespread metrics for this purpose, we can consider for
example the sum of all its elements:
M =
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
dij . (2)
Alternatively, we can consider one of the norms of D (see
Chapter 2.6.5 of [13]), e.g., the L1 norm
M = max
1≤i≤n
m∑
j=1
dij , (3)
which we have adapted to our case, since we are more
interested in picking the record showing the largest distance
from its true value (hence summing along columns rather
than along rows as in the textbook formulation of that norm).
Another norm of possible use is the Frobenius norm
M =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
d2ij (4)
Whatever the norm we employ, the larger it is, the less
useful the anonymized database is.
Correlation. The second metric we consider is corre-
lation. Though a correlation measure is not defined for
matrices, we can convert the matrices of interest into vec-
tors, by reading matrices row-by-row, and then apply the
usual correlation definition. In our case, since we have two
n× p matrices A and B, representing respectively the true
database and the PCA-treated one, we can convert them into
two vectors v and w of length nm, by defining a row index
r and a column index c and relating them to the vector index
k as follows
r =
⌈
k − 1
m
⌉
+ 1
c = k − (r − 1)m.
(5)
We can then apply the classical definition, so that the
correlation is
ρ =
∑nm
i=1(vi − v)(wi − w)√∑nm
i=1(vi − v)2
∑nm
i=1(wi − w)2
(6)
Contrary to the use of the norm metric, now the larger
this correlation coefficient, the more useful the anonymized
database is.
Divergence measure. The values observed for the m
fields of the n records can be considered as a realization
of a multivariate random variable. When comparing the
two databases (the true one and the anonymized one), we
can then compare the two associated multivariate random
variables.
We can then adopt a measure of distance between the two
distributions as a utility metric for the anonymization pro-
cess. A possible metric is Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence
[14]. For our case, we have the two multivariate random
variables a and b, pertaining respectively to the true database
and the anonymized one, with probability density function
φ(a) and ψ(b) respectively, so that the KL divergence is
DKL =
∫
a
φ(x) log
φ(x)
ψ(x)
dx. (7)
Though this is not properly a metric (it is not symmetric),
we are going to employ it by keeping the true database as
a reference, i.e., we always apply it in the same direction,
so that the lack of symmetry is not relevant.
If we assume that the two random variables follow a
multivariate normal distribution, the KL divergence takes
the form [15], [16]:
DKL =
1
2
[
tr(RaR
−1
b )− log
|Ra|
|Rb| −m
]
+
1
2
[
(a¯− b¯)TR−1b (a¯− b¯)
]
,
(8)
where Ra and Rb are the autocovariance matrices of the
two variates a and b.
Under this assumption, the KL divergence can be com-
puted by estimating the autocovariance matrices and plug-
ging them into Equation (8). The larger the divergence is,
the less useful is the anonymized database.
Database image quality. In order to assess how much
utility is retained after principal components are removed,
we can resort to the representation of a database as an image.
In fact, our database can be viewed as a color-scale image,
where the level of color of the pixel of indices (x, y) is the
value of the attribute y of the record x (the same procedure
applies to a greyscale image).
We can liken anonymization to image compression. Image
compression aims at reducing the bit load associated to the
image as much as possible while preserving the quality of
the image, Reducing the bit load amounts to reducing the
information content of the image, which is what we wish to
achieve through anonymization. Since PCA has been applied
to image compression as well [17], [18], [19], we can exploit
the representation of databases as images to translate the
results of image compression through PCA into database
transformation through PCA as well.
Utility reduction can therefore be assessed through the
tools that have been devised to assess the quality of an
image after compression. Assessing the quality of an image
is intrinsically difficult [20], and several approaches have
been proposed, which may be classified into the two classes
named subjective and objective approaches.
A major index employed under the subjective approach
is the Mean Opinion Score (MOS). The MOS has first
been conceived for audio signals [21], and then extended
to images and videos [22]. Several possibilities exist for
the testing methods (see, e.g., [23] for a comparison). The
differences are mainly linked to the number of images that
are shown to the human observer and the grading scale. As
to to the first issue, the observer may be presented either
just with the image whose quality is to be assessed (single
stimulus approach) or with two images, i.e., the image under
test and its reference (free of impairments). In the latter
case we have the so-called double stimulus approach. As
to grading, each observer can assign a mark to the image
under test, by employing either a discrete scale (e.g., a five
points scale) or a continuous scale (which means indicating
a point on a line, where notches are shown corresponding
to marks from 0 to 100). The overall procedure therefore
goes through the following steps:
1) A set of human observers is selected, following the
principles of experiment design;
2) each observer is presented with the image(s) to be
assessed;
3) each observer assigns a grade on the scale indicated;
4) the arithmetic average of the grades assigned by the
observers is computed to provide the Mean Opinion
Score.
Despite its limitations [24], MOS remains a well established
tool to assess the quality of images, and is considered as
the ground truth assessment in many contexts, e.g. when
assessing retargeting tasks [25]. In our case, we envisage
opting for a double stimulus approach, with a continuous
scale to avoid the quantization errors typically associated to
the discrete scale.
Under the objective approach, two major indices are
instead the Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) and the
Structural Similarity Index (SSIM) [26]. For an image of
size n×m pixels, and a resolution of 8 bit/pixel, the PSNR
for the reference image f and the (distorted) image g under
test is
PSNR = 10 log10
2552
MSE(f, g)
, (9)
where the Mean Squared Error MSE is defined as
MSE(f, g) =
1
nm
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
(fij − gij)2. (10)
The PSNR is always non negative but is not bounded; a
high PSNR means that the database with image g is close
to the database with image f (since high PSNR implies
a low MSE). Instead, SSIM is defined as the product of
three quality reduction factors, namely loss of correlation s,
luminance distortion l, and contrast distortion c:
SSIM = s(f, g)l(f, g)c(f, g)
=
σfg + C3
σfσg + C3
× 2µfµg + C1
µ2f + µ
2
g + C1
× 2σfσg + C2
σ2f + σ
2
g + C2
,
(11)
where µf and µg are the average luminances of f and g,
σf and σg the respective standard deviations, and C1, C2
and C3 are three positive constants to avoid having a null
denominator. In contrast to the PSNR, SSIM is bounded
and takes value in the [0,1] range, with higher values
representing images g closer to the reference image f .
Though adopting the image paradigm, we must however
stop short of applying a full parallelism when employing
PCA. In fact, images are typically correlated both horizon-
tally and vertically. While we may assume that a horizontal
correlation (among the attributes of a single record) exists
in databases, it would be hazardous to assume that a vertical
correlation (between different records) exists as well.
A possible approach would therefore consist in applying
image compression through PCA to a set of well-known
references pictures, e.g., Lena [27], by first removing the
vertical correlation (e.g., by randomly shuffling the image
rows) and then progressively removing the largest principal
components, assessing the resulting image quality through
MOS, and proceeding till the image is still recognizable.
We would then consider the number of removed principal
components as the limit number of principal components
that we can safely remove when applying PCA to a database.
We expect the results to depend on the particular image
we are considering, through the structure of eigenvalues. In
order to reduce that bias, we envisage building sets of image
libraries that exhibit a similar eigenvalues structure, e.g. by
looking at the dominant eigenvalue or a parameter of the
Fig. 2: Lena original image
No. of component removed SSIM PSNR
1 0.9335 20.0081
2 0.9036 17.9902
5 0.8614 16.1854
TABLE I: Quality indices after principal components re-
moval
eigenvalue curve. Some sets would allow for just a limited
number of components to be removed before the image is
not recognizable, while other sets would allow for a more
extensive removal before the degradation is excessive. This
could be related to the identifiability of the processed image
(and, in parallel, of the database to be anonymized), and be
considered for properly training the MOS-based anonymizer.
We can report now an early example of the effect of prin-
cipal component removal. In Fig. 2, we show the original
picture of Lena in greyscale.
In Fig. 3, we report the image as it appears after removing
respectively just the largest, the two largest, or the five
largest principal components. The removal of the largest PC
does not impact the quality, while we see some artifact when
we remove two PCs, and the artifacts get more significant
when we remove 5 PCs, though the image is still well
recognizable.
The resulting objective quality indices for those cases are
shown in Table I: similarly to what a quick visual analysis
of the picture would tell us, those indices fall sharply as
more PCs are removed.
As to the identifiability properties of the image as revealed
by the eigenvalue structure, we show in Fig. 4 how the
eigenvalues decay. The superimposed curve is the best fit
(R2 = 0.9993) obtained with a symmetrical sigmoidal curve
y = d+
a− d
1 +
(
x
c
)b , (12)
(a) Removal of largest principal component
(b) Removal of the two largest principal components
(c) Removal of the five largest principal components
Fig. 3: Impact of principal component removal.
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Fig. 4: Decay of dominant eigenvalues for Lena
where c and b respectively act as a scale factor and a shape
factor, with the latter suitable to represent the speed at which
eigenvalues decay. In our case, we have b = 2.21.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Previous proposals to anonymize data do not explicitly
take into account the residual utility of data after the
database has been processed to achieve privacy. We pro-
pose enhancing an approach based on Principal Component
Analysis by incorporating a measure of utility and proposing
four classes of metrics that can be used for that purpose.
This approach represents a step forward in the direction
of devising reliable privacy protection mechanisms that
actually provide usable data.
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